Zelensky’s Victory Plan
Alexander Vindman Why It Matters
Ukainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. (photo: Ronaldo Schemidt/Getty Images)
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What’s in it and What’s Missing
I have mixed feelings about the victory plan. To be clear, I support Ukrainian NATO membership and I support Ukrainian integration into the economic and security structures of the transatlantic community. I also believe that Ukraine can still achieve favorable conditions prior to beginning a negotiation process with Russia and that a major part of this includes having a theory of victory and a concrete vision of what “victory” looks like.
However, I feel that this plan reads more like a wish-list for Ukraine’s partners rather than a document outlining how Ukraine will achieve victory. This would have been an excellent opportunity to specify what Ukraine will do and how it will do it in order to bring the war to a close. A victory plan could specify what role Ukraine’s holdings in Kursk Oblast will play in the later stages of the conflict, how Kyiv plans to liberate its currently occupied territory, how Ukraine will possibly expand its domestic drone and munitions industry to regain momentum against the Russians, or what role unpopular policies like expanded mobilization will play in bringing the conflict to its conclusion.
According to recent reporting, there is an element of Ukraine’s victory plan that was absent from Zelensky’s presentation in parliament: the potential re-nuclearization of Ukraine. Zelensky has stated that Ukraine’s two options for securing a lasting peace are “nukes or NATO…and we want NATO”. Considering that the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine was a major priority of the Bush and Clinton administrations in the 1990s and the cornerstone of agreements like the Budapest Memorandum, the fact that Ukraine is considering possibly developing an indigenous nuclear weapon should be seen as a sign of how decades of arms control agreements have been undone due to of Putin’s invasion.
The world is more dangerous with more states armed with nuclear weapons - but if I can be frank, I can’t blame Ukraine for re-considering its previous policy of denuclearization. Ukraine’s surrender of nuclear weapons was achieved because the United States provided assurances for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. If neither NATO membership nor credible security guarantees are provided, it makes sense that Kyiv would signal a reconsideration of its previous denuclearization. That being said, nuclear proliferation is avoidable: Washington needs to better manage nuclear extortion (discouraging aspiring nuclear-capable states from considering nuclear weapons programs is the ultimate security guarantee) and in the Ukrainian context, provide the tools needed for Ukraine’s security and make meaningful progress towards Ukrainian NATO membership.