For years Netanyahu has failed to draft an Iran policy, and now he refuses to outline a postwar strategy for Gaza. It's a total catering to internal political objectives that leads to rash bombings in the war effort

There was quite a confluence this week: the strike in Damascus on Iranian Revolutionary Guards commanders, Tehran's predictable pledge of imminent retaliation, Israel's killing of three of Ismail Haniyeh's sons and three grandchildren traveling with them in Gaza, and Benjamin Netanyahu's bizarre statement that "there is a date" for an attack on Rafah. All these events lead to an inevitable conclusion: Recklessness reigns and has become the policy of choice.

Taken separately, each of the above makes a certain sense. Strategically, they amount to nothing and achieve nothing. They also evince the fundamental flaw of the last six months regarding Gaza and the last decade regarding Iran: an absolute lack of strategy and a total realignment of military means to political objectives.

A few short days after the negligent and foolhardy killing of seven World Central Kitchen humanitarian aid workers in northern Gaza, and against the backdrop of U.S. condemnations and anger, this is what Netanyahu had to say about the city on Gaza's southern border: "Total victory will not be achieved without an operation in Rafah. There is a date."

It's unclear whether these are the rumblings of a man distraught, disoriented and detached from reality, the conceit of a charlatan, or a desperate politician trying to buy time by placating his gung ho, extremist coalition partners who threatened him. Or maybe this was a prescient statement from a man who has a vested interest in indefinitely prolonging the war and does in fact plan an operation for Rafah in the next month or two.

His latest convoluted statements on the prosecution of the war seem like a hybrid between Gen. Curtis LeMay in World War II and Korea and Gen. William Westmoreland when he commanded the U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968.

The former loved bombing including the massive quantities of incendiary bombs dropped on Tokyo in 1945 and North Korea in 1950 and 1951, where LeMay advocated the use of nuclear weapons, including, by extension, against China possibly. Westmoreland, meanwhile, developed a war of attrition based on "body counts" in Vietnam and then ignored all intelligence and tried to convince America that victory was within reach.

But Netanyahu is no general. Ostensibly, he's a prime minister and is tasked with developing a strategy, not making false, politically-motivated military promises on either Rafah or Iran. This of course goes back to the conspicuous lack of strategy and clear political goals.

Here is the full passage from Carl von Clausewitz's 1832 work "On War": "As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute form. … It is of course well known that the only source of war is politics – the intercourse of governments and peoples. ... We maintain ... that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. … If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute form. ... Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa."

For political expediency, out of inept panic and the lack of a coherent vision, Netanyahu did the vice versa.

The two assassinations have one thing in common: They're vengeance-driven and were done for symbolic reasons. Their value is minimal. Netanyahu claimed that he (and his defense minister) had no idea about the assassination of Haniyeh's sons; anonymous officials explained smartly that "a colonel authorized it."

This isn't an example of delegated authority but of a break in command-and-control structure. A colonel isn't expected to weigh the broader-picture implications of such an action.

Together with the assassination of Revolutionary Guards Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi (who also goes by Hassan Mahadawi) and five others in a building next to the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, the two events have significant escalatory potential. Both operations require a cost-benefit analysis based on the tangible benefits and intangible costs. It's doubtful that such a basic planning principle was exercised.

U.S. President Joe Biden's repeated commitment to stand by Israel in the event of an open confrontation with Iran – echoed by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin – can be viewed as a show of major support. Biden did so very early, in his speech on October 10, when he emphatically declared "Don't." He indirectly and tacitly warned Iran (and Hezbollah) not to escalate, and followed up by sending two aircraft carrier strike groups to the Mediterranean.

Now he sent the head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Michael Kurrila, to Israel for "coordination" purposes. Conversely, this can be viewed as a show of no confidence in Israel's decision-making prowess.

When for years you fail to draft an Iran policy other than grandstanding statements and deafening alarm bells, and when you refuse to outline, in the most general terms, a postwar strategy for Gaza, the quality of your decisions and motives will inevitably be questioned. And the conclusion might be that recklessness, rather than prudence, reigns.