Israel's Democracy Hasn't Been Saved: How the Judicial Coup Eventually Prevailed
Ido Baum Haaretz
A rally in Tel Aviv to protest the moves to overhaul the judicial system. (photo: Oded Balilty/AP)
Fourteen months after Justice Minister Yariv Levin unveiled his bid to weaken the judiciary, the reasonableness standard has been eroded despite its rescue in a High Court decision, and the court now has a conservative majority
Still, that doesn't mean that Israeli democracy has been saved. Israel's drop in the democracy rankings attests to that, but it doesn't tell the whole story.
When Levin unveiled the first phase of his "reform," he claimed that the judiciary's "growing intervention" in cabinet and Knesset decisions was undermining Israeli democracy. So the first item on his agenda – his main aim – was legislation to change the make-up of the Judicial Appointments Committee. Supposedly the goal was to have all three branches of government equally represented on the panel, but it quickly became clear that this was a thinly disguised way of ensuring that the governing coalition had the power to appoint judges.
To achieve his main goal, control over naming judges, Levin declared a war of attrition. He hoped to amend the law governing the composition of the judicial appointments committee, but failed. Then he tried to keep the committee from meeting, but the Supreme Court – sitting as the High Court of Justice – ordered him to convene the panel. Even when he did, Levin prevented it from making decisions that would undermine his planned judicial overhaul.
Meanwhile, two justices have retired – President Esther Hayut and Anat Baron. For the first time in Israel's history, the court has been operating for six months with an acting president, Uzi Vogelman. Levin refused to name a permanent president. Vogelman himself is due to retire in six months, when Justice Isaac Amit will replace him.
If the justice minister stubbornly sticks to his refusal to name a president, Amit will also be serving on an interim basis. If no new justices are appointed, the court will have only 12 justices instead of the usual 15.
Levin achieved his goal in deed if not officially. In its current composition, the court is conservative and noninterventionist. Seven justices, a majority, have a worldview that ranges from conservative to ultra-conservative. Six judges are seen as liberal-activist. When Vogelman retires, the ratio will be seven to five.
The so-called liberal justices of today are a far cry from the activist justices of the '90s. For example, activist Amit opposed Benjamin Netanyahu serving as prime minister while facing three corruption indictments but could find no basis to disqualify him. Amit also said last month that the appointment of far-rightist Itamar Ben-Gvir as national security minister might damage public trust but didn't amount to extreme unreasonableness. This is not judicial activism.
Restraining review by the High Court
Levin portrayed his plans as a desire to protect the legislature against the striking down of laws by unelected judges. This false description camouflaged the fact that, in Israel, the Knesset and cabinet are symbiotic, so, weakening the courts gives the government almost unlimited power. Plus, Israel's Supreme Court remains one of the most restrained in the world when it comes to the striking down of laws. When Levin first presented his plans, the court had never invalidated any of Israel's Basic Laws, which have constitutional status.
Levin failed to annul judicial review, and, on his watch, saw the first striking down of a Basic Law in Israeli history – his amendment to the Basic Law on the Judiciary, which would have done away with the reasonableness standard. Still, the judicial overhaul chalked up a major achievement.
First, today, the court only considers striking down an ordinary law, as opposed to a Basic Law, using an expanded panel. Second, though invalidating a law does not require a supermajority, as Levin would like, the court's conservative majority ensures that a panel of seven, nine or 11 justices – to be decided based on seniority – will always have a conservative majority. The chances of striking down laws have therefore greatly shrunk until further notice.
When it comes to the court invalidating Basic Laws, Levin lost the battle but won the war. A norm has been established that the court will only consider striking down a Basic Law using a full panel of judges. Again, the conservative majority is working. If the court today heard the same petition, the amendment to cancel the reasonableness standard would have survived.
Moreover, the court limited its intervention in Basic Laws to the most extreme circumstances: a Basic Law severely infringing on the core principles of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This approach is so restrictive that it gives the Knesset the option to enshrine in Basic Laws inegalitarian arrangements that the justices don't consider a serious infringement of the country's foundations.
For example, there's a chance that enshrining the ultra-Orthodox's exemption from military service in a Basic Law will be the court's first opportunity to prove its unwillingness to intervene in Basic Laws.
Also, a clause letting the Knesset override the court hasn't been achieved, but it's clear that Levin doesn't need such a tool for now. Ostensibly, an override clause is the only component of Levin's program that senior people in the judiciary were willing to accept. Even the right's "great Satan," Aharon Barak, didn't rule out an override clause. Barak, a member of the Supreme Court from 1978 to 2006, was the president starting in 1995.
The disagreement has largely been over the number of lawmakers needed to override the court. The fact that the override clause wasn't emphasized during the judicial-overhaul campaign was proof that Levin's team felt comfortable with its achievements.
The reasonableness standard
Though the initiators of the judicial overhaul had hoped to completely cancel the reasonableness standard, they happily accepted the new reality – limited use of the reasonableness standard based on the "Sohlberg outline." Justice Noam Sohlberg unveiled the new situation in a High Court ruling in which he, Amit and Justice Yechiel Meir Kasher unanimously decided that the appointment of Ben-Gvir as national security minister did not reflect extreme unreasonableness.
In the ruling, Sohlberg said that a majority of justices believed that they should show restraint in applying the reasonableness standard. He also called for restraint in decisions of a political nature like the appointment of ministers.
Sohlberg's view was one of the approaches proposed to the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee chaired by MK Simcha Rothman in the hearings on canceling the reasonableness standard. Levin and his sidekick Rothman took a more extreme approach, so they failed at the High Court. They lost but the "Sohlberg outline" won.
As Sohlberg wrote last month, "For now, a majority of judges on this court believe that it would be better if we narrowed the reasonableness standard ... judicial restraint that we, the judges, are assuming. This is the position of those who, at the time, were the minority justices in the reasonableness matter and now reflect the majority."
Amit replied, "Many of us believe that there is room to cautiously apply the reasonableness standard, but they, myself included, believe that this is how things are in case law anyway." Kasher joined in.
Getting around the gatekeepers
Before October 7, no week passed without someone from Netanyahu's coalition calling for the ouster of Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara. This has disappeared since Black Saturday, but it's no sudden idyll. Under the cover of war, the government simply ignores the attorney general and the entire legal-adviser system.
Last month, through her deputy, Gil Limon, Baharav-Miara drew Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs' attention to the fact that some government decisions had been made unlawfully, with no staff work, no opinion issued on legal problems, and even without the participation of all the relevant parties. Baharav-Miara cited, for example, the decision to allot 25 percent of the land in an affordable-housing program to reservists and the move to bring in foreign workers through private contractors.
This isn't the first time during the war that the attorney general noted an unlawful action by the government. In every case, Fuchs rejected the attorney general's arguments in writing.
This disparaging attitude toward the gatekeepers is seeping into the brains of all officials who are supposed to protect the public against the arbitrary exercise of power in favor of narrow interests. Against this backdrop, one can understand the attacks by Regional Cooperation Minister David Amsalem against Government Companies Authority chief Michal Rosenbaum that led to her resignation. Amsalem didn't conceal his desire to appoint associates to key positions at government companies.
TheMarker, the Hebrew-language business daily that comes with Haaretz, recently revealed a case that highlights how the coalition's candidates are promoted to positions ostensibly apolitical. A Government Companies Authority audit revealed how Elad Bardugo – whose uncle Jacob Bardugo is a Netanyahu crony – jumped from 18th to first place on the candidate list for legal adviser at road builder Netivei Israel, a government company.
Today, a legal opinion or recommendation is a trigger to launch a campaign against the official who wrote it. A ruling that's supposed to set limits on political power is merely a recommendation to be circumvented.
We've all gotten used to it. Late last month on the "Ulpan Shishi" political news show, the veteran journalist Amnon Abramovich described the dynamics of the war cabinet. He named the "ministers" Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, Ron Dermer and Arye Dery, forgetting that Dery isn't a minister because the High Court disqualified him on account of his chronic corruption.
Long ago, Dery's ultra-Orthodox party Shas realized that there was no need to fight this disqualification. No override was necessary. Dery is a minister for all intents and purposes, without responsibility but with more power and influence than could be imagined.
In the end, most of the judicial overhaul's objectives have been achieved, especially because of control of the Supreme Court and the weakening of the judiciary's restraining power.
In the three-way balance between the branches of government, the court has been diminished. On October 7, Israelis saw with dismay the public service and the ministries struggle and often fail to handle the emergency, but without a strong and independent judiciary these failures will deepen even further.