The Dirty Bomb’s Real Power Is Fear
Mark Hertling The Bulwark
“To really understand whether Americans should be concerned about this report would require knowing more about the credibility of the anonymous sources and the nature of their information.” (image: Sarah Rogers/The Bulwark/Shutterstock) The Dirty Bomb’s Real Power Is Fear
Mark Hertling The Bulwark
Recent reporting suggests Iran might be planning an attack with a “weapon of mass disruption.”
To really understand whether Americans should be concerned about this report would require knowing more about the credibility of the anonymous sources and the nature of their information. Barring that, though, we can at least ask some of the more basic questions, starting with: What is a dirty bomb?
A dirty bomb—a type of what is technically known as a “radiological dispersal device”—is a weapon that uses a conventional explosive seeded with radioactive material. It is not an atomic bomb; it doesn’t emit the massive heat, blast, and radiation (or produce the signature mushroom cloud) that a bomb like those dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki would. As with a conventional bomb, the explosion (caused by, say, TNT or RDX) can result in death, injury, and damage in the blast radius, but after that main danger comes a lingering health risk caused by the radioactive material scattering contamination into the surrounding area.
It is, in effect, a terror weapon that outlives its initial blast.
The next question one might ask: How difficult are they to make?
Compared with a nuclear weapon, a dirty bomb is much less complicated to construct. It doesn’t require enriched uranium, a complex triggering device, or sophisticated engineering to produce a nuclear detonation.
That doesn’t mean that making and deploying a dirty bomb would be simple. Engineers familiar with these kinds of devices tell me that obtaining the radioactive material in the required quantities, handling it without exposure, and mixing it effectively all pose technical challenges beyond those involved in building and deploying a conventional improvised explosive device (IED).
But recent years have shown that Iran and Iranian-backed actors are capable of deploying technically complicated weapons, such as explosively formed penetrators, like those introduced by Iran-backed militias to enhance the effects of IEDs during my time in Iraq, and the more advanced guided drones that have been fielded by Iran over the last decade. So the technical complications involved are not a reason to disregard the possibility of Iran using a dirty bomb.
On to the next question: How difficult is it to transport and emplace dirty bombs?
In addition to technical competence, executing a dirty bomb attack requires access to the necessary dangerous materials, the ability to safely transport those materials to the place where the bomb is made, and then the ability to move the finished weapon (or the ready-for-assembly component parts) to the intended target.
But moving hazardous substances without detection, accidental exposure, or compromising an operation is not easy. That’s because the United States has specialized detection equipment—and in normal times, some damned good counterintelligence capabilities.
Next up: What happens when a dirty bomb explodes?
The simple answer: We don’t really know. The concept of the dirty bomb dates back to the early 1940s. Given the weapon’s nature—suited much more to terror than to military applications—concern about dirty bombs rose as terrorism fears rose in the early 1970s, and then again in the 1990s when worries grew about radioactive materials going “orphaned” after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Warnings were especially widespread in the years after the September 11th terrorist attacks.
Despite the decades of warnings, though, there has never been a confirmed successful detonation of a dirty bomb in a terrorist attack or in combat. Chechen separatists tried to place radioactive material in an explosive device in a Moscow park in 1995, but it was discovered before it was detonated. They tried again in Chechnya in 1998, placing a device near a railway line, but it was also defused. Either of these devices would likely have spread radiation over an undetermined area, possibly causing injury and contamination depending on the size of the blast and the amount of radioactive material used.
The consequences of a successful dirty bomb deployment could be significant. Authorities might have to evacuate or restrict access to affected areas, conduct extensive testing, remove contaminated materials, and undertake expensive cleanup operations. How long the actual danger would last and how far it would reach would depend on many factors, including some outside of human control—such as the weather. But even once the direct physical danger is remediated, the public fear and psychological toll of such a terror attack could remain: Businesses could close, transportation could be disrupted, and residents might remain fearful long after the immediate danger had passed.
Where might dirty bombs be employed?
My own opinion: They would likely not be employed against a military base or troop formations—at least not initially. An enemy hoping to maximize the psychological effects of this kind of weapon would target crowded public spaces, government buildings with high-ranking officials, and economically important locations. Such an attack wouldn’t have to kill a large number of people to be effective, as the psychological consequences of an attack within our homeland, against citizens or government officials, would be enough to generate fear. Terrorism seeks to turn uncertainty into fear and fear into political leverage. If Iran is considering deploying a dirty bomb, that would seem to be its continuing objective.
Finally, What else do we need to know?
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission refers to dirty bombs as weapons of “mass disruption” rather than mass destruction. That is an important distinction. A weapon of mass disruption is especially suited for terror attacks because its effectiveness arises from the resulting fear, economic damage, disruption, and harm to institutional trust.
The administration, our nation’s intelligence agencies, and Congress should give this reported threat needed attention. (Trump administration officials have said there is no “imminent” threat of a dirty-bomb attack, and Iranian officials have denied the CNN report.) Meanwhile, as citizens, we should remember that nothing in this reporting so far suggests that an attack is imminent; at this point, there is no reason to focus too much on worrying about a weapon that has never been used before.